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DO TARGETS GAIN FROM
DEFEATING TENDER OFFERS?
FRANK

H.

EASTERBROOK AND GREc

A.

JARRELL*

Do shareholders benefit from management decisions to rsit tender oJfers? Profcsor Easterbrookand Mr. Jarrellthink the evidence isunequivocal They cite three recent studiesof partoffer movements in the prices of target stocks which shww that successful defensice tacticsby
managementhave deprived targetshareholders of appreciationgains worth betwrcen fiften and
fifty-two percent of the value of targetshares. They then introduce the results of their
own more
conventionalstudy: had these gainsbeen realized and rinvcstcd inequity securities,shareholderswould have fared considerablybetter during the past decade. The authon argue that a
similarstudy by Kidder, Peabody & Co. reaches a seemingly contrary rsultbecause iterroneously compares the post-offer performancesof these target stocks tothe rate of inflation rather
than to the performance of the equity market. The latterfar outpaced inflation
in recent years
and thus, in the authors'ciew, provides a better mcasure of the true cost
of defensrte tactics to
investors. This cost is enormous, the authorsconclude. and warrantsdose judicial scrutiny. if
not outright prohibition, of defensice tactIk.
INTRODUCTION

One of the central questions in the debate about managers' re-

sponses to tender offers is whether defensive tactics are likely to make
the targets' shareholders better off. If the defeat of an offer benefits
these shareholders, then it follows that the decisions whether and how
to defend should receive the same protection the business judgment
rule accords other managerial decisions. If, on the other hand, the
defeat of an offer is bad news for the targets shareholders, application
of the business judgment rule is less defensible.
The business judgment rule is designed to protect managers from
judicial reassessment of decisions that may or may not turn out well
for the firm.' It reflects the fact that business decisions are risky and
often in retrospect seem ill-advised. The business judgment rule gives

managers the freedom to err, and thus it facilitates risk-taking. Perhaps more fundamentally, it reflects the fact that error-prone managers eventually are "selected out" by the process of competition

*Frank Easterbrook is Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. Cregg Jarrel is Chief
Economist of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Both authors were members of the SECs
Advisory Committee on Tender Offers. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily
represent those of the SEC or any of its members or employees. The authors thank Michael
Ryngaert and Jim MuIcrone for their invaluable research assistance.
I See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-87 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 149S
(1983); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-15 (Del. 1984). See generally Fischcl, The "Race to
the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delawarcs Corporation Law, 76
Nw. U.L. Rev. 913 (1982); Veasey, Seeking a Safe Harbor from Judicial Scrutiny of Directors
Business Decisions-An Analytical Framework for Litigation Strategy and Counselling Directors, 37 Bus. Law. 1247 (1982).
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among firms and among managers themselves. 2 Judges, on the other
hand, are not chosen for their business acumen and are not fired or
subject to reductions in salary if they err in assessing business situations. Judges also are accustomed to deciding cases on full records and
may be too quick to blame managers who act-as they often shouldin haste or on incomplete information. It is better to insulate all
honest decisions from review than to expose managers and directors to
review by judges and juries who do not face market pressures.
There has always been increased judicial scrutiny, though, of
decisions by managers with conflicting interests. 3 Under the law of
most states, these decisions are scrutinized for "fairness." This means
that judges ask whether a decision of this type could have been
reached by people acting at arms' length, with no self-interest. Judges
are better at policing managers' loyalty than at policing their astuteness.
Tender offers create conflicts of loyalty in almost every case: to
defend against the offer is to defend against a threat to one's job as
well. Managers' promises of fidelity to shareholders' interests are less
likely to be honored when the stakes are so large for the managers
themselves. Even when the evidence of conflicting interests is weak,
some courts have been willing to restrict the scope of managers'
discretion. For example, some courts have closely scrutinized directors' efforts to dismiss derivative litigation pending against fellow
directors. 4 When the evidence of conflict is convincing-when certain
kinds of self-interested decisions always or almost always turn out
poorly for the shareholders-the rationale of the business judgment
rule is seriously undermined.
Defensive responses to tender offers could be classified as "ordinary" business decisions and protected by the business judgment rule.
They could be classified as "self-interested" decisions and subjected to

2 See Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence
(collecting and discussing the evidence about how markets influence and discipline managers)
(on file at New York University Law Review).
3 Where a director has a personal interest in fending off a threat to corporate policy and
control, courts do not presume that the director has acted in the corporation's interest. See, e.g.,
Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964); Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962); Condec
Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967).
4 Compare Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983)
and Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) with Auerbach v. Bennett, 47
N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). See generally Scott, Corporation Law
and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 927, 940-46
(1983).
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review for "fairness." Or they could be classified as outside the scope
of managers' implicit authority and banned altogether. Each of these

positions has its partisans.
Recent judicial decisions, supported by much commentary, apply

the ordinary business judgment rule.5 The cases are not very strong,
though. Each of the three most important was decided by a vote of

2-1, and state courts have yet to speak. In contrast, some scholars have

argued for outright prohibition of defensive tactics.0 (There is a fur-

ther dispute about whether attempts to find "white knights" and run
auctions, in addition to attempts to remain "independent," should be
Within such a ban.7 For current purposes we examine only outright

defenses, by which firms seek to defeat all offers.) The SEC's Advisory
Committee on Tender Offers took a middle position, proposing to
permit some defensive tactics, to regulate others by requiring special

5 See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-99 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380-84 (2d Cir. 19SO); Johnson
v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); see also
Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3
Corp. L. Rev. 107 (1980); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Targets Boardroom: An Update After
One Year, 36 Bus. Law. 1017 (1981) [hereinafter Lipton Update]; Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Targets Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1231
(1980); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Targets Boardroom, 35 Bus. Law. 101 (1979); Lowenstein,
Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 249
(1983); Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 5S N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 621 (1983).
6 See Baron, Tender Offers and Management Resistance, 38 J. Fin. Econ. 331, 342 (1983):
Bebehuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 102S, 1029,
1054 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Targets Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1198 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids,
Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. Law. 1733, 1733 (1981); Cilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33
Stan. L. Rev. 819, 878-79 (1981); see also SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, Report of
Recommendations 99-104, 109-20 (1983) (separate statement of Easterbrook and Jarrel arguing
for a prohibition of defensive tactics as a second-best solution to the inequalities created by the
Williams Act and responding to arguments favoring unrestrained defense) [hereinafter Advisory
Committee Report].
One important assumption in these anti-defense arguments is that the Williams Act or some
equivalent set of rules hinders the tactics of bidders and gives the target managers the opportunity to mount effective defenses. If bidders were free to select their tactics, we and many of the
other authors listed above would take a quite different position on judicial review of defensive
tactics.
Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 Stan. L.
Rev. 1 (1982) (opposing auctions as well as outright defense) with Bebchuk, The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 23 (19S2)
(opposing defense but not auctions) and Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity
in Tender Offer Defense, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 51 (1982) (same, but on different arguments).
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votes of shareholders, and to ban some under defined circumstances. 8
Some courts, too, have used the Williams Act to prohibit certain
defensive tactics.9 Such decisions appear to have support from the
Supreme Court's statement, in the course of invalidating state antitakeover laws, that defensive tactics are damaging to shareholders.' 0
Many paths lie ahead. The recommendations of the SEC's Advisory Committee must be considered by Congress and the SEC, as well
as by the state legislatures and the courts." The American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project will address tender offers and
defensive tactics. Although some portions of the ALI's project have
been circulated in draft form, the part on these subjects has not been
written. Proposed revisions of the ABA's Model Business Corporations
Act are circulating for comment, and the proposals contain recommendations that bear on these subjects. Congress, the SEC, the ALI,
and the ABA all need to know whether defensive tactics are likely to
make the targets' shareholders better off. To shed light on this issue,
we present some evidence from financial economics and then consider
the major piece of contradictory evidence. We show that, when

8 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6, at 13 (considering regulations of auctions), 18
(Rec. 9.b recommends that the business judgment rule govern takeover contests), 34 (Rec. 33
endorses business judgment rule, subject to caveat in n.31 and Rec. 34 concerning state antitakeover laws), 36 (Rec. 35 opposes high barriers to change of control in articles and bylaws), 3637 (Rec. 36 calls for supermajority voting on some anti-takeover provisions), 38-39 (Rec. 37 calls
for advisory votes on some defensive provisions), 40-41 (Rec. 38.a would ban Golden Parachutes
adopted after commencement of an offer), 42 (Rec. 39.b would prohibit self-tender with
expiration date in advance of bidder's date), 43 (Rec. 40 would ban PAC-MAN defense as a
response to a bid for 100% of target's stock), 44 (Rec. 41 would limit issuance of stock during
offer to 15%, unless shareholders' approval obtained).
9 See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981) (lock-up options
granted by target to competing tender offeror manipulative); Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v.
Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y.) (same), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983). Contra
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir.) (sale of option and treasury stock
by target to competing tender offeror not manipulative), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983); see
generally Note, Target Defensive Tactics as Manipulative Under Section 14(e), 84 Colum. L.
Rev. 228 (1984).
10 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (defenses hinder the "reallocation of
economic resources to their highest valued use" and reduce "the incentive the tender offer
mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well").
1, The SEC has endorsed some of the Advisory Committee's proposals, rejected some, and
stated that it needs more time to examine others. See Statement of John S.R. Shad, Chairman of
the SEC, to the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,511 (Mar. 28, 1984). The
Commission appears quite skeptical about defensive tactics, proposing (among other things) to
prohibit the issuance of lock-up options amounting to more than 5% of a firm's stock without
approval by shareholders. See Tender Offer Reform Act of 1984, H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984). It has expressed doubt, though, that anti-defense rules should come from federal
rather than state law.
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viewed in the proper light, the evidence is not contradictory at all.
Both sources of evidence demonstrate that targets' shareholders lose
when managers defeat tender offers. Because what is good for investors in this respect is good for the economy as a whole, the loss is felt
12
widely.
I
THE EVIDENCE ABoUT DEFEATED OFFERS

A. Direct Price Comparisons
There are two kinds of evidence about the consequences of defensive tactics. Those who support defensive tactics have argued that
corporations that fend off tender offers often do quite well. Martin
Lipton describes the fate of McGraw-Hill, which defeated an offer for
$40 only to see the price of its stock rise above that level within tvo
years, as an example.13 According to Lipton, other targets also prosper
after defeating offers. This line of argument draws substantial support
from a study by Kidder, Peabody & Co.
The Kidder study' 4 analyzes 38 defeated hostile tender offers
between 1974 and 1982 in which the target remained independent for
at least one year. The study used four different methods to assess the
effect of defeating a tender offer. Depending on the method used, the
study purports to show that the shareholders of between 45% and
97 % of all targets did better, as a result of the defeat of the offer, than
they would have done if the offer had succeeded. At the low end of
Kidder's range is a comparison of the price on February 28, 1983,
discounted at the rate of inflation, versus the offer price. The discounted February 28 price exceeded the offer in 45 % of all cases. The
high end compares the highest price a stock attained after the offer
with the original offer; 97% of the "highs" exceed the original offer.
The inference many draw from the Kidder study is that defense
often is beneficial to targets' shareholders. If this inference is correct,
then it seems to follow that managers' decisions should be fully pro-

12 Some people have said that tender offers may be socially bad, though privately profitable,
because they "use up credit" or othenvise distort markets. This kind of criticism reflects ignorance of how credit markets work, as the SEC's Advisory Committee unanimously recognized.
See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6, at 13-14, 72-74.
13 See Lipton Update, supra note 5, at 1026.
H The Kidder study was submitted to and considered by the SECs Advisory Committee on
Tender Offers.

HeinOnline -- 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 283 1984

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:277

tected by the business judgment rule.15 On the other hand, if the
Kidder study is misleading, quite a different inference is in order.
B. Evidence from FinancialEconomics
There is a body of evidence that suggests that the Kidder study is
not the right way to look at things. This evidence, developed through
the use of the powerful tools of financial economics, focuses on the
movements in the price of stock at the time an offer is made and at the
time it is defeated. The methodology works roughly as follows."0 First
examine the movements of a firm's stock in the recent past to determine its "beta"-the extent to which its movements are a function of
the market's or some industry group's movements. For example, if on
average a stock's price rises 2% when the market (or its industry
group) rises 1 %, and falls 2 % when the market falls 1 %, the stock has
a beta of 2. Then use the stock's beta, together with knowledge of
what other stocks did near the time of a tender offer, to determine any
"abnormal" movements in the price of the stock. If the stock has a
beta of 2, and the market rises 2 % on a given day, we expect the stock
to rise by 4 % on average. If it rises 6 %, then it has done better than
expected, and the 2 % difference is an unexpected gain to investors. If,
instead, it rises only 1 %, it has done 3 % worse than expected; we
infer that something bad happened to the firm in relation to the
market. The next step in the process is to examine the abnormal gains
and losses of all targets near the time tender offers are made and
withdrawn. Do they gain, relative to expectations, when offers are
made? Do they gain, relative to expectations, when offers are defeated
and withdrawn? The final step is to separate targets that defeated
offers into two groups. The first contains targets that remained "independent." The second contains targets that were acquired by another
bidder, whether this occurred with the target's consent or over its
objection.

15 Only "seems" to follow because what is beneficial to shareholders when an offer Is on the
table is not necessarily what shareholders would have selected in advance. If a strategy that
drives up the price also decreases the likelihood of an offer, it may or may not help shareholders.
See the exchange of views in note 7 supra.
16 For more detailed statements of the method and its applications, see, e.g., Brown &
Warner, Measuring Security Price Performance, 8 J. Fin. Econ. 205 (1980); Fisehel, Use of
Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus.
Law. 1 (1982); Schwert, Using Financial Data to Measure Effects of Regulations, 24 J.L. &
Econ. 121 (1981).
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Three studies of this character have been performed in an effort
to determine the effects of defensive tactics.17 All three studies show
that investors in firms that defeated offers and remained independent
for some time lost significantly when compared with the value of the
offer and the value of successful transactions. They disclose identical
patterns: the price of a targets stock rises dramatically, approximately
30 % relative to the rest of the market, when an offer is announced. If
the first offer is defeated and a later offer succeeds, the price rises a
little more. If the offer is defeated and no other takes its place, the
entire gain is lost. At the cost of omitting some other important data
and qualifications, we summarize the findings as follows:
Study

Appreciation on
Announcement of Bid

Effect o[
Defeat,

Effect of
Sale in Auction'

n.a."

Cost of
Defeat

ca. - 15%

Asquith

ca.15%

+1.0%

Bradley, Desai & Kim

35.5%

+3.43%

55.73%

-52.3%

Jarrell

30.0%

+9.0%

38.00%

-29.0%

* Relative to pre-offer price. The Bradley, Desai & Kim data show effects one year after the
initial bid; the Jarrel data show effects 100 trading days after the bid; the Asquith data show
effects 60 trading days after the bid.
** Asquith's method of reporting data does not permit us to extract this number.
* To compute the cost of defeat, we simply used the appreciation on the announcement of the
bid as an estimate of the opportunity cost of defeating the bid.

The table shows, to use the Bradley study as an example, that
when a bid was announced stock prices appreciated by about 35%.
When a bid was defeated, the price fell back to approximately the
same level as before the bid (an increase of 3.4% relative to pre-bid
price); when it succeeded, the average auction premium was about
56%. Thus the loss the shareholders suffered because of defeat, the
available premium less the post-defeat value, was about 52% of the
total value of the stock. The effect in no-auction cases is the first
column (35%) less the second, or a loss of about 32%. All studies
demonstrate very large differences between how shareholders fared
when their firms defeated offers and how they would have fared had

'7 See Asquith, Merger Bids, Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 51
(1983); Bradley, Desai & Kim, The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers: Information or
Synergy?, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 183 (1983); Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do
Interests Diverge in a Merge? (forthcoming in J.L. & Econ.) (draft on file at New York
University Law Review). For a comprehensive summary of many, related studies, see Jensen &
Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5 (1953).
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the offers been successful. (The other studies apply slightly different
methods of analysis to different samples of offers over different periods
of time. Thus the difference in the results is not surprising.)
We find these data exceptionally powerful. All three studies show
that the defeat of an offer means very large losses for investors. Other
people are reluctant, however, to draw the obvious inference. In
presenting these findings to the SEC's Advisory Committee on Tender
Offers, and in other forums, we have encountered a number of responses worthy of brief discussion. Before we start, though, it is
important to realize that the methods generating these numbers are
not controversial within the economics profession. There is no debate
about this subject in the way monetarists, Keynesians, and supplysiders debate employment and inflation. The method of analyzing
market returns is almost universally accepted as valid, subject only to
questions about the sources of data and the exact structure of the
equations. 18
1. Profits Versus Prices
The data we report are based on stock market movements at the
time of the events, not accounting numbers or "real" profits. Thus, it
may be said, they do not show either social gains or "reliable" gains to
investors. As it turns out, accounting profit studies also do not measure
real social gains,' 9 but this is not terribly important here. For investors, what matters is that they can cash out immediately at a gain and
invest elsewhere. 20 For society, what matters is that the higher prices
accompanying acquisitions reflect estimates of future gains. Prices are
reasonably good proxies for these gains, at least when large numbers
of firms are involved, because stock prices are based on estimates of
future real profits and dividends. Higher equity prices also attract
new capital into the market and increase the rate of savings. (For
what it is worth, the available evidence on the profitability of tender

"sThere is, for example, debate about whether the "arbitrage pricing model" offers slightly
better estimates than the model used in the studies we described; about the strength of the
inferences; and about the comprehensiveness of the samples of events on which the conclusions
are based. These differences, even taken together, affect only the magnitude rather than the
existence or direction of the effects described.
"oSee Fisher & McGowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly
Profits, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 82, 97 (1983); Liebowitz, What Do Census Price-Cost Margins
Measure?, 25 J.L. & Econ. 231, 245-46 (1982).
20 For purposes of this analysis, we disregard other considerations that might affect a
shareholder's decision to cash out: the tax consequences and transaction costs of selling stock, the
costs of locating a suitable alternative investment, and the availability of a market for the stock
or a satisfactory appraisal remedy.
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offers suggests that they result in no unusual profits or losses. In other
words, an investment of $X in a target appears to be about as profitable for a bidder as an investment of $X in other assets, such as new
plants. This is what one would expect to see if managers of bidders are
behaving rationally.)
A related argument is that the finance studies emphasize the
short-term results at the expense of the longer term. Managers, it may
be said, know the longer term better than the market. This criticism
misses the mark for two reasons. First, it is not accurate to say that the
studies of abnormal returns are flawed because they look only at
"instantaneous" price changes and not changes over a longer period.
The studies do both. The studies summarized in the table above offer
an "instantaneous" result in the first column. They tell you what
happens to all of the target's stock when a bid is made for part or all.
(The reason the abnormal gain is less than the average premium of 5070 % is that most bids are for less than all stock, and some bids fail.
The "all stock" appreciation reflects the fact that not all investors will
receive gains in all cases.)
The results in columns two to four are delayed results. Column
three shows offers that we know in retrospect were successful. The
investors in targets in these successful offer cases receive appreciation
higher than the gains that we observe on the day the offer is made.
Column two shows targets that we know in retrospect defeated all
offers for an extended period. The investors in these targets show
either losses, two years later, relative to the pre-bid price (Bradley,
Desai & Kim) or losses, four months later, relative to the initial price
(Jarrell). The losses relative to successful bids, shown in column four,
are staggeringly large.
The second reason why this criticism is unavailing is simple:
many careful studies have shown that the price of stock on any given
day is the best estimate of the price of stock in the future. We return to
this below.
2. Unusual Events
The studies of tender offers treat gains and losses to investors as
averages, while individual cases may diverge from the pattern. This is
true, but the implication is obscure. When legislatures or courts design
rules of law, they must act on the basis of averages rather than
outlying or unusual events. Society gains from inventions and the
construction of new plants, even though many inventions and new
plants are wastes. The fact that in 5% of all cases the investors of
targets that stay independent may gain is not a very good excuse for
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defense, as a rule, if the other 95% lose and if- as we think likelyany rule of law designed to protect the 5 % also affects the other 95 %
2 1
to their detriment.
3. Imperfect and Incomplete Evidence
The studies we have mentioned inevitably have flaws. They are
based on incomplete samples of tender offers and may be affected by
the quirks of particular offers. Thus one cannot say the data are
"conclusive." Yet this is an unrealistic demand for economic data.
Suppose we were to study business decisions about whether to engage
in searching for new ways to grow corn, or about introducing new
products, or building new plants. The evidence about the profitability
of these highly beneficial things is much less powerful than the evidence about tender offers. To believe, as some apparently do, that
society does not lose much if managers defeat offers because the data
do not conclusively prove the damage of such actions is to believe that
society also would not lose if Congress systematically set about to
discourage new ideas, new products, and new plants.
4. Inefficient Markets
Many people just cannot believe that stock markets are efficient,
and they reject all studies and inferences that in their view are based
on assumptions concerning efficiency. Louis Lowenstein is a good
example. He argues that many targets are "well managed," so tender
offers are unlikely to be value-increasing, and that markets cannot be
efficient because stock prices jump around "too much" in relation to
"intrinsic values" for the market to be pricing them well. 22 Thus,
Lowenstein argues, the stock market data are misleading and independence is a beneficial goal.
There is an enormous body of evidence showing that stock markets are efficient both in the sense that the price of stock on any given
day is the best estimate of its future price and in the sense that
movements in the price of stock are "unbiased" (meaning that changes

21 Investors prefer whatever arrangement maximizes total gains. This is obvious if each

investor holds a diversified portfolio, but it is also true of undiversified investors. See Makowski,
Competition and Unanimity Revisited, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 329 (1983); cf. Easterbrook &
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale L.J. 698, 711-14 (1982). Because shares are
tradeable and are repriced in response to legal rules, no rule can succeed in transferring income
from one class of investors to another.
22 See Lowenstein, supra note 5, at 289-94.
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neither overshoot nor undershoot the price in the longer run).2 Those
who challenge the efficiency of the stock markets usually do not take
issue with these findings. They maintain, rather, that the markets are
inefficient in the sense that "the price is not right." That is, they
observe (accurately) that often a stock is over- or under-priced in
relation to its "true" (future) value.
Efficiency in this "right price" sense is not, however, an assumption of the method used in the studies we reported above. Evaluation
of the gains and losses from offers depends only on the assumption that
the degree of pricing accuracy does not change rapidly. So long as the
price a year from now is about as likely as today's price to be "right,"
inferences based on large numbers of cases will be reliable. "Wrong"
prices will offset one another, and any substantial changes in average
prices, or average responses, will enable us to determine the costs and
24
benefits of defensive strategies.
C. The Kidder, Peabody Study Once More
A substantial number of skeptics remain. We have heard over
and over the question: "If these studies are right, then what about the
Kidder, Peabody study?" The implication is that the Kidder study is
countervailing data, and that the dispute calls for continued application of the business judgment rule.
The Kidder study examines the consequences of defenses by comparing the bidder's offer against an "adjusted" price of the target's
stock at some later time. The adjustment takes into account any
inflation during the time between the offer and later price. If the bid
was made in 1980, and the later price was observed in 1982, Kidder
deflated the 1982 price to "1980 dollars" using the Consumer Price
Index (CPI). It then compared this deflated price with the offer. If the
deflated price exceeded the offer, Kidder concluded that the defense
was beneficial for the target's investors. Using this definition, Kidder
concluded that investors gained between 45% and 97% of the time
(depending on the subsequent date chosen).
We have checked the Kidder sample, data, and computations.
We found no serious errors. Yet we are unshaken in our belief that
23 See R. Brealey, An Introduction to Risk and Return from Common Stocks 3-20 (2d ed.
1983) (summarizing many of the pertinent studies); see also J. Cragg & B. Malkiel, Expectations
and the Structure of Share Prices (1982) (impressive demonstration that market professionals do
not "beat the market," as they should if there were unexploited opportunities for those with the
best information to outguess today's price).
2 See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6, at 107-09, 116-18 (separate statement of
Easterbrook and Jarrell discussing the role of "efficiency" in creating and interpreting similar

data).
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successful defenses are calamities for the target's investors. This is so
because the Kidder study simply is not inconsistent with the work
examining abnormal returns. The Kidder study is a textbook example
of how, if you approach data with the wrong question, you will get a
misleading answer.
To understand why Kidder's question is wrong, consider a simple
example. Suppose you own stock in Widgets Inc., which on December
1, 1980, was trading for $20. The next day Raider Corp. bids $30 for
100 % of the stock. If successful, Raider would pay cash on January 1,
1981. Widgets Inc. beats back the offer, and you are left with shares
that on January 1 trade for $20. Two years later, your stock trades for
$34 (including the value of reinvested dividends). The 70 % gain over
$20 looks pretty good. Are you better off? Kidder would say "yes."
The $34 is higher than the $30 bid, and if you adjust the $34 to "1981
dollars" you still have more than $30. Kidder would view anything
25
over $33.94 as a gain.

You would disagree with Kidder, though, if you thought you
could do better than inflation with your investments. Suppose you had
$30 in hand on January 1, 1981, to invest however you wanted. If you
had bought a market basket of stocks, you would have had more than
$34 by January 1, 1983, because during that time a value-weighted
index of New York Stock Exchange firms, including reinvested dividends, rose 14.64 %, exceeding inflation. 26 Knowing how Widget Inc.
does against how you would have done with the cash is the sort of
comparison you would care about. The stock versus the CPI does not
tell you much unless by accident the market just tracks inflation. As it
turns out, though, for most of the period covered by the Kidder study,
especially 1980 and 1982-83, the stock market gain was much greater
than inflation. Thus the Kidder study is seriously biased because it
ignores what happened to other equity investments.
The extraordinary rise in the stock market over 1980-83 places
the defeated bids in a different perspective when compared with the
subsequent price of the target. Kidder labels defeats as beneficial just
because the whole market rose. Similarly, if the market had fallen,
Kidder's method would have greatly overstated the losses incurred by
investors in targets, because the price of the targets would have gone

's The Consumer Price Index increased 8.9% in 1981 and 3.9% in 1982. Thus $30 x 1.089
x 1.039 = $33.94.
20 This figure and all the others in our study come from the tape of daily stock prices
maintained by the Center for Research in Securities Prices at the University of Chicago.
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down with the market while the imputed value of the bids would have
risen with inflation. None of this is a very satisfactory way to assess
consequences for investors.
It is possible to make an accurate comparison only by taking into
account how the market as a whole behaves. We tried to do this. To
see how investors really fared, we did a new study, using all of the
firms in the Kidder sample that were traded on the New York or
American Stock Exchanges, according to the following method. This
method uses none of the assumptions and practices that are challenged
by those who do not accept the findings of modem financial economics.
We assumed that the targets "accepted" the bidders' offers and
that the shareholders invested the proceeds in a diversified portfolio of
all equities traded on the New York and American Stock Exchanges.
(Of course particular investors would have purchased some less complete sample, but the market as a whole indicates how investors as a
whole would have done.) Then we examined this investment one,
two, three, etc., months after the offer to see how the portfolio was
performing compared with the targets' actual stocks (given the real
defeats of the offers). If the portfolio was doing better than the target,
we viewed the defeat of the offer as bad news for the targets' share27
holders.
We constructed an index that compares the results of the actual
investment (given the defeat of the offer) with the hypothetical investment following the hypothetical success of the offer. If the two are
equal at any time after the offer's defeat, the index is 1.00. If the
actual stock is 10% higher than the basket of equities obtained after
success, then the index is 1.10. If, however, the shareholder would
have done better with the defeated offer, the index is below 1.00. If,
for example, the target's stock does 10% worse than the investor
would have expected to achieve in the market, the index is 0.90.
The results of this study are striking. A month after the offers, the
targets' stock was trading for about 10% less than the "invested

2 This method actually understates, by a substantial amount, the gains the investors would

demand to make them indifferent between the success of the offers and their defeats. There has
been a generally rising market in equities. The stocks of individual targets are riskier investments
than the stocks of the market as a whole. In order to be indifferent between targets stocks and
the market, investors demand compensation for the risk, and these individual stocks actually rise

faster than the market (while other firms, such as AT&T and big utilities, rise more slowly). In
treating targets' stocks as if they were as safe as the whole market, we give a substantial
advantage to the thesis that defense is beneficial. In other words, the method described In the
text erroneously assumes that targets' stocks have beta coefficients of one.
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proceeds." Two months later, we see a further 10% decline. Three
months (60 trading days) after the offers, 27 of the 31 firms in our
sample have index values less than one. Five months (100 trading
days) after the offer, 28 of 31 still have indices less than one; the
average index is .83.
Over the course of two years after the offer, the targets as a group
fluctuate at a 10 % to 20% loss relative to the "invested proceeds."
There they sit. The targets never recover. The invested proceeds
always do better. So it turns out, if you ask the right question, that the
single apparently contrary study is not so contrary after all.
We reproduce our study in an appendix in both tabular 2 and
graph form.29 In the table the company is listed in column one. The
other columns give the date relative to the announcement of the offer.
Date -20 is 20 trading days (a month) before the offer, and so on. In
each column there are two index numbers for each company. The
bottom number is the index we have described above. The top number gives the current price of the stock on the listed trading date
relative to a basket of equities that could have been purchased by
selling the stock 40 days before the offer. This top index will equal
1.00 whenever the offer (followed by defeat) made the shareholders
no worse off than they would have been if no offer had ever been
made. The final listing in the table, called the "Equal Weighted
Portfolio," is the average index of all 31 target stocks. The index
number relative to the offer (the lower number in the table) is less
than one for the portfolio as a whole on all subsequent dates and less
than one for the vast majority of all targets on each subsequent date.
In the first graph the horizontal axis is the number of days after
the announcement of the initial bids, and the vertical axis is the
relation between the actual price of all target stocks taken as an
average (subtracting market movements) and their price at the time of
the offer. It is the equivalent of the bottom index in the table. This
ratio drops steadily from 1.00 at the time of the offer to about 0.85
after it becomes clear that the offer has been defeated. The second
graph is the equivalent of the table's top index. It shows a rise from
the average pre-offer price to more than 1.40 at the time of the offer.
This is a benchmark; it shows what the investor could have had by
taking the offer. The subsequent decline illustrates how the gains
slowly ebb away over time as the likelihood that the offer vill succeed
(or that another offer will be made) goes down.

2 See Appendix

A at 294-97 infra.
21See Appendix B at 298-99 infra.
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The table shows that some targets' stocks did better than the
investor would have done by taking the offer and investing in the
market as a whole. For example, 60 trading days (three months) after
the offer, four of the 31 firms had indices exceeding one. (We use the

second index number from the table because it shows value relative to
the offer.) Does this demonstrate that some managers cleverly out-

guessed the market and saved their investors from losing money?
To test whether the presence of some gains shows astuteness or

just random variance, we asked the following question: "If every
manager who resisted a tender offer expected the firm to lose 10 % of
its value, what number of firms nonetheless would appreciate just by
chance?" In other words, how likely is it that the pattern of gains and
losses we observe would exist even if every target expected its index to

be 0.90? This is a simple test, for which statistical methods are well
developed.30 The test shows that the probability is about 98.84% that

chance alone would have produced four "winners" even if all defeats
of tender offers were expected to be bad news for the targets' investors. 31 Indeed, this method of looking at the data predicts that managers expected to lose about 20 % relative to the market by defeating
the offers. Given such an expectation, and given the volatility of the

targets' stocks, four targets could have had indices exceeding 1.00, just
by chance.32 That is exactly what happened.
CONCLUSION

It does not matter how one looks at defeated tender offers. Any

method that takes into account the movement of the stock market
30 This statistical approach assumes that prices fluctuate around some "true" value and that
the size of the average daily fluctuation is known but the direction of the fluctuation is selected
randomly. It is possible to find out how far, and with what probability, a future price would
diverge from this "true" value after n days of such fluctuations. A large number of trials with a
given "true" value and average daily fluctuation will yield a probability distribution, the mean
and median of which will be the "true' value, with prices extending higher and lower. By
specifying the expected fluctuation and the "true" value, we can therefore find the likelihood
that on a given day the actual price in the market will be a given amount higher than the -true7
value.
3, We omit the description of the method, but it is a standard combinatorial problem. It
helps to think of the process as one that fils an urn with balls, some of which are colored to
reflect the probability that by chance a given firm with a history of fluctuating prices vill have
an index value exceeding one after 57 days of fluctuations. For the sample of firms here, the
chance for each firm is 2,840 in 10,000. If you draw 31 balls from an urn containing 10,000 balls,
and 2,840 of the balls are black, what is the chance of getting at least four black balls? We will
not go into the math behind the answer, which turns out to be 98.84 %.
32 If you use the method employed in note 31 supra and select an index of 0.80 as the
expected or true value, you find that the chance of any one targets index exceeding 1.00 is
12.7%. The best expectation is that you will draw about four black balls in 31 tries from a large
urn, if 12.7% of the balls are black.
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shows that managers who resist tender offers to the point of defeating
them do a grave disservice to their investors. The size of the loss is
52 % of value by some methods, such as comparing success with defeat
in the Bradley, Desai & Kim study reported above; it is 30 % of value
using the method in Jarrell's study reported in the same table. If we
use the most conservative assumptions, such as assuming that targets'
stocks are as "safe" as the whole market (which we did in reassessing
the Kidder study), we can shrink the size of the loss to 15 % or so. But
the loss just will not go away. A 15 % loss in tender offers of the sort
examined here represents an enormous loss in shareholders' equity.
These findings have substantial implications for the treatment of
the business judgment defense. If, as the data show, managers who
resist tender offers to the point of defeating them almost always harm
the shareholders, there is little reason for judges to accord deference to
these decisions and good reason to treat them as self-protective measures. The inference we draw is fortified by still another kind of
evidence. Managers who try to defend are overpaid (relative to the
firm's profits and the pay of managers elsewhere) and in danger of
replacement. 33 Their efforts to keep their salaries and positions are
understandable but not excusable. It is past time to prohibit defense or
subject it to the most exacting scrutiny to protect the interests of
investors.

33 Waling & Long, Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance, 15
Rand. J. Econ. 54 (1984).
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